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ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS

I. Introduction
The pendulum of credibility weighs heavily
against a defendant who challenges the
admissibility of his confession. If admitted, it will
prove a virtual guarantee of conviction, as it is the
most "potent of weapons for the prosecution."'
Although prosecutors lament the layers of
constitutional rights in place to protect a defendant
against coercive interrogation methods, most
challenges to admissibility will come down to the
detective's word against that of the defendant.
Absent a recording, the court will be called upon to
decipher events that took place in communicado and
will be consigned to speculate about what actually
took place, weighing the relative credibility of
witnesses. Where the court is left to speculate about
what actually transpired, it is no secret that the
defendant rarely prevails when a confession is in
evidence. The entire set of rules governing the
relationship between the suspect and interrogators is
built on a house of cards whose major weakness
resides in the premise that a court can accurately
determine what transpired during the interrogation
process. 2
1 Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, CoercedConfessions and the
Jury: An Experimental Test of the "Harmless Error"Rule, 21
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1997); see also Gail Johnson, False
Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for
Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U.
PUB. INT. L. J. 719, 741-43 (1997); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S.
Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 90607 (1996).
2 See Wayne T. Westling, Something is Rotten
in the
Interrogation Room: Let's Try Video Oversight, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 537 (2001).

2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL. I: 3

389

The system now relies on DNA testing and
widespread use of videotaping in DUI enforcement.
Crime scenes and drug investigations are recorded
on video cameras installed to monitor traffic and
record license plates of people who violate traffic
laws. New technology is employed on behalf of the
State in enhancing prosecution proof, not to ensure
or expand a defendant's right to a fair trial. Police
and prosecutors find the use of videotaping costeffective in many criminal justice activities, but not
during interrogations. 3 Unfortunately, too many
interrogations are aimed at securing a confession
without regard to securing reliable, fair, and
objective indices of proof. Fundamental unfairness
may arise not only because the confession may be
unreliable, but also because no confession may have
been forthcoming if the interrogation had been
properly conducted. One irony of the failure to
electronically record an interrogation is that when
interrogators record such statements, courts readily
admit them at the prosecutor's request.
The Tennessee Legislature recently embarked
on an ambitious enterprise to render an accused's
statements made during custodial interrogation
inadmissible against the accused unless the entire
interrogation were recorded.4 Any statement made
during a prior custodial interrogation without being
recorded in compliance with the bill's guidelines
would be inadmissible for purposes other than
3 See Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras
Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of InterrogationsIs the Solution
to Illinois Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.
J. 337 (2001).
4 The bill targets only custodial interrogations in detention
facilities. It would also require that Mirandarights and the
accused's waiver of them be part of the recording.
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impeachment. 5
Coerced
and
involuntary
confessions undermine both the integrity of our
criminal justice system and the constitutional rights
of defendants. One simple and expedient method of
addressing that problem is to videotape the entire
interrogation process. A videotape record would
provide a more complete accounting from which a
judge could make essential Miranda determinations
such as voluntariness, the presence of warnings, and
the waiver of rights. 6 It would allow a judge to
view a suspect's demeanor to help determine
whether the suspect understood his rights. A
videotape would also alleviate the problems of any
contested confession by allowing a judge to view
the exact dialogue between suspect and interrogator
and determine whether that dialogue casts doubt on
the voluntary nature of the confession. By viewing
a recording of the entire interrogation process, a
judge is able to see exactly what transpired in the
interrogation room and further evaluate the
confession in its own context.
This article assesses the feasibility,
appropriateness and legal and political status of
recording interrogations. Section II of this paper
begins with a general discussion of the law of
confessions, both from the United States Supreme
Court and Tennessee courts. The current state of
the law makes assessment of the voluntariness of
confessions highly problematic. In that regard, we
discuss the "voluntariness" and "totality of
circumstances" tests and argue that both tests are
inherently vague and rely extensively on the court
5 See generally S.B.

0343iH.B. 1138, (2003) (amending TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-14, et seq., if enacted) [hereinafter
"Tennessee proposal"].
6See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and jury to engage in specific fact-finding as to
what took place in the interrogation room.
Section III deals with a variety of topics related
to the current climate, both political and legal,
regarding mandatory interrogations. Included in
this section is an extensive survey of the costs and
benefits of recording interrogations as well as a
discussion of the current national state of the law
regarding videotaping. In addition, we discuss
Tennessee's legislative attempts at implementing
recording requirements. In addition, this section
examines the findings and recommendations of the
Tennessee Law Enforcement Advisory Council. 7
In Section IV we argue that the Tennessee
Supreme Court could bring the current legislative
impasse to an end if the court ordered mandatory
videotaping of interrogations as a function of its
inherent supervisory powers to regulate and
administer a fair and reliable criminal justice
system.
I. The Problematic Nature of Confessions
A. The Voluntariness Test
The traditional test for admissibility of a
confession is the "voluntariness" test. 8 A statement
is "involuntary" and inadmissible if the defendant's
was "overborne" or his "capacity for self7Pursuant

to H.R.J. Res. 862, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2002), the Tennessee Law Enforcement Advisory
Council was directed to report its study and evaluation of
issues related to electronic recording of custodial
interrogations in Tennessee to the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees.
8 See

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).

5
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determination critically impaired when making the
statement." 9 In order to make a determination of
voluntariness, a court must examine the "totality of
the circumstances," including the characteristics of
the individual suspect and details of the manner in
which the interrogation was carried out. Without
some improper state action such as coercive police
tactics, there is little likelihood that a court will
deem a confession involuntary. If involuntariness
were found to exist, the prosecution would be
precluded from using the statement for any purpose
whatsoever.
1
Later, as established in Miranda v. Arizona, 0
police were required to first tell a suspect of his
rights and then obtain a waiver of those rights prior
to a custodial interrogation. 1 Failure to satisfy any
of the Miranda requirements would result in a
suppression of the confession, even when a suspect
had given a voluntary confession. The prosecution
is precluded in its case-in-chief from using a
defendant's statement that was obtained in violation
of Miranda.
Unlike involuntary statements,
however, statements obtained as a result of a
Miranda violation may be used to impeach a
testifying defendant who perjured himself at trial. 2
As a result of Miranda v. Arizona, most
litigation regarding confessions centers on the
applicability of the Fifth Amendment. However,
until the Miranda decision in 1966, the United
States Supreme Court relied on other constitutional
provisions for determining the admissibility of
confessions, focusing largely on the voluntariness
9Id.

'o 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"Id. at 467-77.
12Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).

6
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of a suspect's confession in determining its validity
and admissibility.13
In Brown v. Mississippi, the United States
Supreme Court recognized Fourteenth Amendment
due process principles as requiring the exclusion at
trial of involuntary confessions extracted by
coercive police methods. 14 The case involved three
suspects brutalized by sheriff's deputies. One of the
suspects was hanged from the limb of a tree.15 He
was later tied to a tree and beaten until he
confessed. 16 The other suspects were stripped and
whipped with a leather strap in such a severe and
atrocious manner that their backs were "cut to
pieces."' 17
The United States Supreme Court
described the techniques used by the deputies as
"compulsion by torture" and revolting to the sense
of fundamental fairness and justice.'
Ultimately,
the Supreme Court of the United States found that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the use of involuntary
confessions or coerced confessions. 19
The
Tennessee Constitution provides the same
protections.2 °
Tennessee was not immune from review under
the standard enunciated in the Brown decision. In
the case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee,2 1 police
interrogators carried out 36 hours of uninterrupted,
incommunicado interrogation of a suspect using a
13See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
14See Brown, 297 U.S. 278.
15 Id. at 281.
16

id.

17Id.
'8Id.

at 282.
at 285.
19See Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
20
TENN.CONST. art. I, § 8.
21

322 U.S. 143 (1944).

7

394

ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS

string of replacement interrogators during which the
interrogated individual was allowed virtually no
sleep or other rest. In reviewing the interrogation
procedure used, the United States Supreme Court
held that the situation was "so inherently coercive"
that, by its very nature, the interrogation was
"irreconcilable with the possession of mental
freedom by a suspect against whom [the] full
coercive force [of
the criminal justice system was]
22
bear."
to
brought
With the cases of Massiah v. United States23and
Escobedo v. Illinois,24 the focus of the Supreme
Court shifted for a brief time from the voluntariness
of a suspect's confession under the Due Process
Clause to a defendant's right to assistance of
counsel, as provided by the Sixth Amendment.
However, two years later with the decision in
Miranda, the Court directed that the Fifth
Amendment be the guiding force behind inquiries
into the admissibility of confessions. 25
The burden of proving the voluntariness of a
suspect's confession lies with the prosecution. It is
the trial judge who determines whether or not that
burden has been sufficiently met to admit the
confession into evidence. 26 The standard under due
process for determining the admissibility of a
confession ultimately focuses on the issue of
whether the behavior of state officials overcame the
suspect's will to resist, such that the suspect's

22

Id.at 154.
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
24 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
25 See 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23

26

See State v. Pursley, 550 S.W.2d 949 (Tenn. 1977).
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confession was not freely given.2 7 The dispositive
question in each case is whether a2suspect
confessed
8
because his "will was overborne.,
B. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
A court's determination of "voluntariness"
utilizes the totality of circumstances
test.
Voluntariness is assessed by looking at the totality
of circumstances surrounding the process of
interrogation including, but not limited to, a
suspect's age, education, and mental and physical
condition. 29 Courts also consider the nature of the
interrogation itself, including the location, duration,
and methods used by the interrogators. 30
The
totality of circumstances test, however, made the
applicable guidelines to be followed less than clear.
Under Supreme Court precedent, physical torture
and abuse of suspects would constitute per se
coerciveness. 31 Perhaps the primary problem with
the totality of circumstances tests is that no single
factor, short of physical torture or abuse of the
suspect, is determinative of a finding of
involuntariness.
There are no precise limiting
factors restricting interrogators in obtaining
confessions.
The factors a court must take into consideration
include both internal attributes of the suspect and
external factors affecting a suspect. The relevance
27 See State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980)

(citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961)).
28 Fulminate, 499 U.S. at 287 n.3 (1991).
29
See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).

30 Id.
31See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

9
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of both a suspect's personal attributes and external
pressures exerted by a suspect's surroundings and
methods of interrogation means that the amount of
coercion
needed to render a confession
"involuntary" may vary from context to context.
Courts have acknowledged that a person with a
weaker mental framework might be much more
prone to give an involuntary statement due to
certain external factors which might be insufficient
to render a confession involuntary if made by a
suspect with
a stronger internal make-up or
32
character.
The failure by the courts to offer clear
guidelines has made courts have to rely more on a
factual examination of events that transpired
between interrogators and suspects. The problem is
that in situations where no full, objective record of
the entire interrogation event exists, the application
of the voluntariness test turns largely on a swearing
contest between the suspect and his interrogators.
A major turning point in the use of the totality
of circumstances test under the due process
voluntariness standard took place in the case of
Escobedo v. Illinois.33 Escobedo was significant in
the sense that it reflected the Court's disfavor of the
voluntariness approach. It explicitly recognized the
strong link between a defendant's right to counsel
and his privilege against compelled selfincrimination. Rather than focusing its attention on
the voluntariness issues of Escobedo's confession,
the Court turned its attention to the fact that police
continually denied Escobedo's repeated requests to
32

See, e.g., State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1988).
" 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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speak to his attorney. 34 In addition, the Court was
mindful of the fact that no one ever informed the
defendant of his right to remain silent. 35 The Court
struck a poignant note with its comment that no
system worth preserving should have to fear that a
defendant permitted to consult with an attorney will
exercise his rights even if the exercise of such rights
will "thwart
the effectiveness" of the interrogation
36
process.

The Fifth Amendment applies to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and provides that "[n]o person.. .shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."3 7 The Tennessee Constitution also

provides that a defendant cannot be compelled to
give evidence against himself.38 These privileges
against self-incrimination appear to frame and limit
police interrogation methods and the admissibility
of confessions.

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court

extended the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination by making it applicable to police
interrogations of suspects in custody. 3
In that
decision the Court delineated certain safeguards
deemed necessary to protect a suspect's rights.40
The Court determined that no statements by a
suspect, which stem from a custodial interrogation
of the defendant, can be used in the criminal
prosecution "unless [the State] demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective [in] secur[ing a
34

Id. at 481.

" Id. at 482-83.
16Id. at 490.
37
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38
TENN. CONST. art. I § 9.
3' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41 See id.
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' '
suspect's] privilege against self-incrimination. A
According to the Court, before a custodial
interrogation can take place law enforcement
officers must advise a suspect of his rights to
remain silent and to consult an attorney.42 If the
suspect indicates either a desire to remain silent or

requests an attorney, the questioning must cease.4 3

The suspect can invoke these privileges "in any
manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning. ' 44 The state bears a heavy burden in
demonstrating that a suspect "knowingly and
intelligently" waived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to counsel.4 5

In the

absence of demonstrated police compliance with the
procedures articulated in Miranda, statements
obtained from a suspect in custody are presumed to
be coerced and are not admissible in a criminal
prosecution as a matter of law.4 6 As a result, the
Miranda warnings and a valid waiver are
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement
47
made by a suspect during custodial interrogation.
Subsequent decisions have gradually diminished
Miranda's importance by expanding the types of
words and actions constituting a waiver and
recognizing that some statements in violation of the
Miranda requirements may be introduced into
48
evidence to impeach a defendant's credibility.
Moreover, the Supreme Court created a "public
41

Id. at 444.

42

Id. at 467, 470.

Id. at 473-74.
44d. at 473.
4 Id. at 475.
41

46d. at 478.
47

Id. at 473-76.

See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see also
Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).

48
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safety" exception, doing away with the need for
Miranda warnings when police question a suspect
at the scene of a crime that involves an imminent
threat to public safety.4 9 However, it is important to
note that involuntary statements cannot be used for
any purpose, including use of those statements for
impeachment of the credibility of a defendant
who
°
himself.
perjures
and
stand
the
takes
C. Tennessee Decisions
The Tennessee Supreme Court case law on
confessions and interrogations has largely mirrored
that of the Supreme Court. While Tennessee courts
employ the "voluntariness" test to judge the
admissibility of confessions, the test of
voluntariness for confessions under Article I,
Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution is
interpreted as being more protective of individual
rights than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth
Amendment. 51 Further, the Tennessee Supreme
Court does not recognize any authority requiring
that interrogations be electronically recorded.
Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Tennessee noted in
State v. Godsey,S neither the Tennessee Constituion
nor the United States Constitution requires
electronic recording of interrogations. The court
noted that mandatory electronic recording of
custodial interrogations would reduce court time
49
50

See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Harris v.

New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).

51 See generally State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn.

1996); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1994).
See also, V. Lakshmi Arimilli, Confessions and the Tennessee
Constitution, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 637 (1995).
52

60 S.W. 3d 759 (Tenn. 2001).
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required to resolve disputes over what took place
during the interrogation process, and opined that
sound policy considerations would support its
adoption as a law enforcement practice.53 The court
stopped short of requiring electronic recording of
interrogations as a constitutionally grounded
prerequisite to the admissibility of statements by a
defendant, while acknowledging that such recording
could be beneficial. At the same time, as the court
noted, "the issue of electronic recording of custodial
interrogations 'is one best suited to the direction of
the General Assembly' [of the Tennessee
Legislature]."54
III. Recorded Interrogations
A. Overview
The common characteristic of almost all
unrecorded interrogations is that they take place in
communicado, totally closed to outside scrutiny.
The content of statements can be controlled by how
investigators choose to interrogate, and too often a
suspect's confession appears to be a doctored
version of what the interrogator has suggested.
Without the knowledge that an interrogation is
being recorded, an interrogator's dedication may
become an unhealthy zeal, which may in turn lead
to perjury or slanted testimony.
An accurate
recording of the entire interrogation would enable a
fact-finder to ensure that witnesses testimony was
based on genuine recall. A recording would also
"
54 Id. at 771-72.
Id. at 772 (citing State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23-24
(Tenn. 1996)).

14

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL. I:

3 401

assist the trier of fact in ascertaining the
voluntariness of a suspect's confession and the
context in which a particular statement was elicited.
At the very least, it would be a step toward
protecting suspects from coercive police tactics and
the police from false claims of coercion. It would
also instill some reliability into judicial
determinations as to what went on during an
interrogation in which a suspect made statements.
Finally, recording the interrogation would reduce
skepticism regarding the integrity of the process.
Given the well-publicized developments in the
Central Park Jogger case, as well as the rampant use
of coerced or otherwise improper confessions in
Chicago, Illinois, the advantages and necessity of
mandatory recording of interrogations should be
self-evident. 55
The absence of a recording
requirement hurts everyone except the police.
Defendants questioning the voluntariness of their
confessions, the adequacy of the Miranda
admonitions, or their purported waivers must do so
without the best evidence.
Fact-finders must
determine voluntariness, adequacy of rights
admonitions and the validity of a waiver without the
best evidence. Failure to record and preserve the
best possible evidence undermines the legitimacy
and credibility of the criminal justice process and
opens the possibility of the abuse of power by the
police.
See Charles D. Weisselberg, Deterring Police from
Deliberately Violating Miranda: In the Stationhouse After
Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121 (2001). See also Drizen &
Colgan, supra note 3; Stevan A. Drizen & Richard Leo, The
Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82
N.C. L. REV. 893 (2004).
55
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Mandating that interrogations be electronically
recorded has long been recognized as a means of
advancing our criminal justice system.56
The
American Law Institute's Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure and the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure require electronic recording of
custodial interviews. In Miranda, the Court noted
various forms of psychological pressure routinely
employed by interrogators. 57 As Chief Justice
Warren recognized, the only purpose of such
techniques was to "subjugate
the individual to the
58
will of the examiner."
Little systematic reform of the interrogation
process has taken place despite recognition that
psychological pressures are often present in such
encounters. In developing the Miranda rules, the
Court likely believed that a suspect informed of her
right to remain silent and the right to counsel would
understand those rights and make appropriate
decisions.
That belief has turned out to be
incorrect.
Miranda was a small step toward
confronting various forms of psychological
pressure.59 Trial judges who make determinations
as to whether a suspect waived his rights during an
56 James P. Barber & Philip R. Bates, Videotape in Criminal

Proceedings,25 HASTINGS L. J. 1017, 1020-26 (1974);
Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A HardLook

at a DiscomfitingRecord, 60 GEO. L. J. 209, 23 8-43 (1977);
See Roscoe Pound, Legal Interrogationof PersonsAccused or
Suspected of Crimes 24 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &

CRIMINOLOGY
1014, 1017 (1934).
57

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446-54; see also Johnson, supra note

1 (providing an excellent exposition of the psychological
9sames
played by interrogators during interrogations).
8
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
59

See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrinein the

Supreme Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99-169.
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interrogation are hampered by the lack of objective,
reliable evidence as to precisely what was said or
done during an unrecorded interrogation.
As discussed more fully in this Section, there is
cause for optimism. Currently three states - Alaska,
Minnesota, and Texas - require the electronic
recording of custodial interrogations.
A fourth
state, Illinois, recently enacted a more limited
recording requirement requiring officers to tape
interrogations of murder suspects. 60 In 1985, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that "an unexcused
failure to electronically record a custodial
interrogation conducted in a place of detention
violates a suspect's right to due process" under the
Alaska Constitution, and that any statement thus
obtained is generally inadmissible.
The court
mandated recording of station-house interrogations
as a reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential to
the adequate protection of a defendant's right to
counsel, his right against self-incrimination, and
ultimately, his right to a fair trial. 6 1 The court
further reasoned that the integrity of the judicial
system was at issue whenever a court determined
the admissibility of a questionable confession based
upon the testimony of interested parties.
The
Alaska Court recognized that a recording
requirement would buttress judicial integrity merely
62
by "the flip of a switch."
In State v. Scales,63 the Minnesota Supreme
Court utilized its supervisory power and authority
by mandating that all custodial interrogations of
criminal suspects at a place of detention, including
60 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1 (West 2003).
61Stephan v. State, 711 P. 2d 1156, 1159-60 (1985).
62

Id. at 1164.
63 State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994).

17
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any information concerning rights, waiver of those
rights, or questioning, be electronically recorded
where feasible. The court recognized that the
process of in communicado interrogation and its
perceived benefits by the police would be preserved
while at the same time facilitating the judiciary's
task of fact-finding since it would be based on
reliable information.
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires
that custodial statements used against a defendant in
a criminal proceeding be recorded.64 Illinois will
become the fourth state in the nation to require
police to record interrogations. 65 The Illinois statute
requires officers to tape interrogations of murder
suspects only. 66 The statute was one of numerous
reforms recommended by then-Governor George
Ryan's Commission on Capital Cases.
The
commission was a response to 13 condemned men
who had been exonerated, some due to allegations
of police 6 7 misconduct,
including
coerced
confessions.

B. The Benefits and Costs of Recording
Every year, hundreds of innocent Americans are
convicted of crimes because of false confessions. It
Art. 38.22 §3 (1999). See
also Ragan v. State, 642 S.W.2d 489, 490 (Tex. Crim. App.
64 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

1982).
65
66

See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-21 (West 2003).
This legislation was signed into law by the Governor on

July 17, 2003, and takes effect in 2005. Steve Mills, Law
Mandates Taping of PoliceInterrogations,CHI. TRIB., July

18, 2003, § 1, at 1; see also, Leonard Post, Illinois to Tape
in 2 States, 25

Questioning:It Gets Mostly Good Reviews

L.J. 46, P1 (2003).
See Post, supra note 66.

NAT'L
67
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is impossible to count how many people are charged
based on false confessions and subsequentl!y
released after exonerating evidence comes to light.
Confessions obtained through coercion and
intimidation are inherently untrustworthy; they
obfuscate rather than illuminate the truth. The
courts have to encourage practices that promote the
truth, particularly in capital cases, in which the
defendant's life is in jeopardy. Taking steps to
ensure the integrity of our criminal justice system is
of the utmost importance. Requiring electronic
recordings as a prerequisite to the admissibility of a
confession would significantly aid courts by
presenting accurate facts to a jury for deliberation.
Electronic recordings of police interrogations
facilitate a number of desirable goals. A recording
provides an objective record and prevents a police
officer from unfairly intimidating a suspect to
obtain a statement before actually recording it. An
interrogator who is aware that he is on tape would
most probably act appropriately rather than risk his
credibility. Moreover, law enforcement agencies
that videotape interrogations find that it improves
the ability of police to assess the guilt or innocence
of a suspect. 6 9 Videotaping allows detectives to
review the entire interrogation as the case unfolds in
light of subsequent evidence. It also preserves the
details of a suspect's statement that may not have
been initially recorded in an interrogator's notes but
subsequently become important. Furthermore,
68 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 55 (documenting and

analyzing over 125 false confessions).
69 See William A. Gellar, Police Videotapingof Suspect
Interrogationsand Confessions: A PreliminaryExamination
of Issues and Practices, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

(1992).
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videotaping permits other officers to evaluate the
plausibility of suspects' statements.70
In addition to aiding police in their assessment
of guilt and innocence, videotaped admissions may
be used against co-conspirators more effectively
than written statements.
Such recordings are
especially effective against suspects who are
familiar with deceptive physical evidence ploys.
Police departments already using videotaping
reported that videotaped interrogations and
confessions led to more guilty pleas by suspects. 7 1
Prosecutors have noted that by catching details
that would otherwise remain missing from written
interview notes or reports, videotaped interrogations
provide a more complete record with which to
better assess the state's case against an accused.
They found that such taping enabled them to better
prepare for trial. Because videotaped interrogations
provided them with better knowledge of the case,
including the demeanor and sophistication of the
suspect, prosecutors found that videotaping assisted
them in negotiating a higher percentage of guilty
pleas and obtaining longer sentences. 72 Judges and
juries found that videotaping allowed them to
determine more accurately a defendant's state of
mind, as well as the sincerity of the defendant's
remorse for any wrongdoing.73
Recording would also conserve judicial
resources by reducing the number of frivolous pretrial challenges to confessions, which often involve
70

71
72

/d. at 5.

Id. at 5, 6 and 10.

Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical

Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 409 (1996).
73 See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J.
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996).
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a "he said, she said" contest. A recording speaks
for itself, literally, on the issue of what was said and
the manner in which it was said. It would facilitate
the resolution of a case in most instances because,
in many cases, recording would eliminate debate
over
the
circumstances
surrounding
such
confessions. Issues of compliance with Miranda,
voluntariness, and allegations of physical abuse and
psychological overbearing would be minimized
because a trial judge could make a determination
based on objective and reliable information.
Recording would serve as the best method for
aiding the court's determination of voluntariness in
light of the totality of the circumstances.
A variety of objections have been raised about
videotaping the interrogation process. It has been
suggested that videotaping is not feasible, for
example, because of space, personnel and funding
limitations. Also, videotaping of suspects puts an
unfair burden on law enforcement and would
significantly lower the successful clearance rate in
investigations of serious crimes.74 In the early
stages of an investigation, the police often do not
have a clear idea of what happened, let alone who
the suspects are. To require that all questioning of
suspects be videotaped might significantly slow the
course of many investigations and create an
unacceptable risk for public safety. The main
objection raised by police and prosecutors against
recording is that it would prove to be impractical
and costly to record all stationhouse interrogations.
Specifically, such an objection centers on limited
resources, including the price of videotape copies

74

/d.
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and the 7number
of hours involved in recording and
5
storage.

However, the cost of video or audio-electronic
recording machines and tapes is relatively small
compared to the cost incurred by investigation time,
attorney time, and court time in conducting pre-trial
hearings regarding the admissibility of a
confession. 76
Cost-saving considerations may
include reducing interrogation time. Recording
could alleviate the need for detailed note taking.
Additionally, increases in the number of guilty pleas
and decreases in the number of suppression
hearings involving defense challenges to the
admissibility of an unrecorded interview could
decrease the expenditure of judicial resources. Not
only could the criminal justice process see savings,
but the ancillary costs of civil litigation over false
and problematic confessions could be reduced as
well.
Ironically, police and prosecutors view
videotaping to be cost-effective in other aspects of
the criminal justice process, but not in the context of
the interrogation process. Anyone familiar with
DUI cases knows that most patrol cars are equipped
with video cameras. The ultimate cost-benefit
determination in favor of recording is the
enhancement of the integrity of the judicial system.
Any objective method of determining the credibility
75 See Drizin & Colgan, supra note 3, at 408-10;

Memorandum from David Jennings, Deputy Director, TBI, to
Curtis Person, Chairman Senate Judiciary Committee and Joe
Fowlkes, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee, on The
Report of the Tennessee Law Enforcement Advisory Council
on Recording Custodial Interrogations 2 (May 6, 2003) (on
file with authors).
76 GellAr, supra note 69 at 47-49.
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of the respective parties enhances integrity. 7 State
recording would open the door to the interrogation
room and shine light on the process. Given the
overriding importance of systemic integrity, it
seems odd that the issue needs debate. Indeed, as
the United States Supreme Court recently made
clear, the reliability of evidence involving
statements taken by police must be assessed "by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination. 78 The
Court's decision reflects not only the desire for
reliable evidence, but also a means to determine
reliability.7 9 If out-of-court statements elicited in
interrogations were important enough to require
cross-examination for admissibility, then surely the
procedural mandate of recording an interrogation
would be conducive to the goal of reliability.
A 1992 study for the National Institute of
Justice found that a number of police agencies
throughout the United States regularly videotaped
80
all or portions of the interrogation process.
Furthermore, over half of the nation's police
agencies use video technology for other purposes,
even if not necessarily the recording of
interrogations.8 1
Those
who
implemented.
electronic recording for interrogations expressed
widespread satisfaction. According to the study,
video technology has taken hold as one of the
important administrative and operational tools of
modem criminal justice agencies. The researchers
found that of police departments that videotape
interrogations, 65.8 percent found the procedure
77
78

See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (1985).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

79

id.

80 Gellar, supra note 69, at 94.
81 Id. at

91-94.
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"very useful" and another 31.3 percent found the
procedure "somewhat useful."' 2
Given the
technology, the general sentiment expressed by
departments using videotaping was that it was
appropriate. Not using video is like not using stateof-the-art fingerprint analysis equipment.
The
larger the department, the more likely they are using
videotaping. The study found that 97 percent of all
departments in the nation that are videotaping either
confessions or full interrogations find such
videotaping, on balance, to be useful.83
The broad findings of the 1992 study indicate
that videotaping has fostered improvement in the
quality of police interrogations. Desirable changes
in interrogations included: (1) better investigator
preparation for interview by forcing investigators to
think out their questions and the sequence of
questions in advance; (2) the ability to interrogate a
suspect without the distractions of a typewriter,
notebooks, statement forms, or court reporters; (3)
the ability of other police and prosecutorial
personnel to monitor the interrogation live via
closed-circuit television and to send suggested
questions into the interview room; and (4) the
opportunity for interrogators to view the videotape
in order to evaluate the suspect's earlier statements
and demeanor and to formulate further questions for
any continuation of the interview. Taping would
also allow for training new detectives and for
providing 84 advanced training to experienced
detectives.
One important finding was the distinction
between
agencies
videotaping
the
entire
82Id. at

152.

83id.

4Id. at 110-11.
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stationhouse interrogation, including preliminaries
such as the admonitions and waivers required by
Miranda, and those videotaping only the
"recapitulation" -- a statement recited by the suspect
only after some prior "softening up" or unrecorded
questioning of the suspect by police personnel. The
distinction is important with regard to the reactions
of the various groups surveyed. Generally, all
participants supported recording of the entire
interview whereas recapitulation tapes were
criticized for neglecting to record 85the most critical
portion of the questioning process.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
provided anecdotal support for the recording of the
entire interrogation session.
In Zimmerman v.
State,86 the trial court overruled the defendant's
motion to suppress his confession despite his
testimony that he was physically mistreated.
Following his conviction for capital murder, a
federal investigation into the interrogating officer's
conduct resulted in discovery of a recording of the
officer's conversation with the defendant in which
the defendant inquired whether he would be beaten.
The officer answered in the negative, adding that
the defendant would not have been beaten in the
first instance had he not been lying. Ruling on a
motion for a new trial, the trial judge acknowledged
his error in overruling the motion to suppress the
confession.
All participants in the survey agreed that
videotaping saved time and promoted greater
respect for police procedures. There were fewer
allegations of improper police conduct and those
85 Id. at 133-34.

86 Zimmerman v. State, 750 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988).
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made were easier to resolve. Participants involved
in the criminal justice process agreed with the
merits of videotaping. Importantly, in jurisdictions
in which interrogations were recorded, there was
greater confidence in the judicial determination of
the admissibility of a suspect's statements, as well
as a higher
degree of credibility afforded the
8
verdict. f
The issue for our system, as the study began by
noting, is not whether video technology presents an
ideal tool to fix all existing problems, but whether it
is more reliable and efficient than traditional
documentation methods and does not present
offsetting complications or costs. 88
Despite
variations, such as taping full interrogations versus
recapitulations only, and taping overtly versus
covertly, the videotaping of suspects' statements is
a practical, efficient, and affordable step towards a
more reliable, objective and legitimate criminal
justice system. Electronic recording might require
law enforcement officers to alter their interrogation
tactics and could force states to budget for audio
and video equipment. Notwithstanding these costs,
however, a suspect's constitutional rights ought to
be the underlying rationale for requiring electronic
recording of interrogations.
C. The State of the Law on Recording
During the past four decades of interrogation
monitoring, it has become obvious that recorded
interrogations can significantly buttress judicial
review of a process to which the police and a
suspect are often the only witnesses. The inherent
87
81

Gellar, supra note 69, at 133.
Id. at 28.
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difficulty of determining what actually transpired
during an interrogation together with the importance
of enforcing a suspect's right against selfincrimination provided much of the motivation for
the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v.
Arizona.89 The decision mandated that, prior to any
interrogation, police officers admonish suspects in
custody of certain constitutional protections they
possess. As a result, judges and legal scholars
began calling for routine tape recording of
90
stationhouse interrogations.
The arguments for reform have remained
consistent in their rationale that a recording would
best assist a court in deciphering what actually took
place in the interrogation room. An electronic
recording would provide the most efficient and
effective means for a court to reconstruct the actual
conditions of the interrogation in order to discern
whether constitutional procedural safeguards had
been followed. The ability to resolve a "swearing
contest" on the basis of an objective and reliable
record would minimize the speculative, fact-finding
function of the court in determining who is telling
the truth, a decision usually deferring to the police
officer.
Notwithstanding the recognized advantages of
electronic recording, only four states require
electronic recording of interrogations: Alaska and
Minnesota mandate recording through court

89

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.

90 See, e.g., Barber & Bates, supra note 56; Leo, supra note

73; Pound, supra note 56; Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes,
Comes a Time: The Casefor RecordingInterrogations,61
MONT. L. REv. 223 (2000); Drizen & Colgan, supra note 3;
Westling, supra note 2.
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decisions; 91 Texas imposed a more narrow
requirement via a state statute that prohibits the
admission of an unrecorded oral confession; 92 and
Illinois
implemented
the
videotaping
of
93
interrogations in homicide prosecutions.
The
question remains why many, if not most,
stationhouse interrogations in the United States
remain unrecorded. The fact that courts have
undertaken little reform in this area is confusing in
light of the fact that the Supreme Court seemed to
go out of its way in Miranda to encourage such
innovation. "Congress and the States are free to
develop their own safeguards for the privilege
against self-incrimination, as long as those
safeguards are as effective as those devised by the
Court." 94
Given the rather straightforward
arguments for mandatory recording, such as having
an accurate, objective record of what occurred
during the interrogation, one can only surmise that
critics of recording are threatened95 by the unveiling
of the interrogation process itself.

The Tennessee Supreme Court, considering the
issue in State v. Godsey,96 declined to require
taping, noting that neither the Tennessee State
Constitution nor the Federal Constitution requires
such recording. 97 Although the court in Godsey
provided a long list of states that have similarly
91 Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1156; Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 587.
92 George E. Dix, Texas "Confession " Law and Oral SelfIncriminatingStatements, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 1 (1989).
93 Post, supra note 66; Mills, supra note 66.
94

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490.
95 Leo, supra note 73, at 687; Drizen & Colgan, supra note 3,
at 392-93.
96 State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759 (Tenn. 2001).
97
1d. at 771.
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declined to impose such a requirement,98 the court
nevertheless recognized the minimal inconvenience
and
expense
associated
with
recording
interrogations and the sound policy considerations
that support its adoption as a law enforcement
practice. 99 It seems the court's justification for
rejecting a recording requirement was based solely
on the fact that it is not recognized as a
constitutional due process requirement.
The Godsey court ended its discussion of
electronic recording by stating that the issue was
00
more appropriate for legislative consideration.'
One legal commentator astutely pointed out that in
reading opinions such as Godsey it is easy to
conclude that courts are reluctant to be perceived as
acting as super legislative bodies. This reluctance is
due primarily to the fact that taking a stand on
constitutional grounds would demand some type of
affirmative action by the court that would force the
government to create a quasi-right with "financial
implications."'01
Other courts have commented little about why
tape recording of confessions is not constitutionally
required, and further, why, even in the absence of a
constitutional imperative, such a requirement should
not be mandated under a court's supervisory power.
As Sklansky points out, most courts have relied on
the United States Supreme Court decisions of
California v. Trombettal°2 and Arizona v.
9' I. at 772, n.7.
99
/d. at 772.
100 Id.
1o1David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in
ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure,88 VA. L. REv. 1229,
1269-70 (2002).
102 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
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Youngblood'0 3 in holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require the police to preserve evidence solely on the
basis that it might later prove exculpatory. 1°4
However, those cases were construed as such
because of the federal guarantee of due process and
did not impose restrictions on the application of
parallel guarantees within state constitutions, nor
did they restrict a state appellate court's right to
exercise its supervisory power in implementing
such a requirement.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has restrained
from establishing a recording requirement, either
out of unwillingness to interpret the Tennessee
Constitution in a different sense than the Federal
Constitution or perhaps out of deference to the state
legislature. Although recognizing the value that
such a rule would have in terms of conserving
judicial resources in resolving disputes over
interrogations, the Tennessee Supreme Court
continues to decline to adopt such a rule on due
process grounds.' 0 5 Tennessee judges seem to be
reluctant to act as gatekeepers for the jury except in
cases of overt and manifest abuse, particularly in
the absence of a reliable means of establishing
allegations of illegality and impropriety.
While a number of common law countries
including Great Britain, Canada, and Australia'1 6
have adopted a requirement that police tape record
103

488 U.S. 51 (1988).

See Sklansky, supra note 101, at 1267-68.
'o' See Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 771-72.
106 See generally Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 90; Wayne
104

T. Westling & Vicki Waye, VideotapingPolice
Interrogations:Lesson from Australia, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 493
(1998).
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interviews with suspects, only two state courts have
mandated a similar requirement.

In the landmark

case of Stephan v. State,1°7 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Alaska Constitution requires electronic recording of
custodial interrogation conducted in a place of
detention. °8 Any statement obtained in violation of
that due process right is generally inadmissible in a
proceeding against the defendant.' 0 9
Stephan
involved conflicting testimony about what occurred
during the unrecorded portions of the interrogation.
Stephan claimed that his confession was the product
of promises of leniency and was obtained in the
absence of an attorney after his request for one.
The officer testified to the contrary, leaving the trial
court to resolve the conflict and evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses.
Without a full
recording, the court chose to believe the officer's
recollections in making a determination that the
confession was voluntary and, thus, admissible at
the defendant's trial.
Of course, courts faced with conflicting
testimony from defendants and officers tend to
defer to an officer's recollection of what took place
during the interrogation process at the expense of
the defendant's account. In most instances, in the
absence of a tape recording,
the officer invariably
10
wins the swearing contest.
The Stephan court was convinced that recording
"is now a reasonable and necessary safeguard,
essential to the adequate protection of the accused's
right to counsel, his right against self-incrimination
107 711 P.2d 1156.
18

Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1159-60.
110 See Harris v. State, 678 P.2d 397 (Alaska App. 1984).
109
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and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial."''
The
court emphasized that its holding was based solely
upon the requirements of Article I, §7 of the Alaska
Constitution.
While recognizing that custodial
interrogations need not be recorded in order to
satisfy the due process requirements of the Federal
Constitution, the court felt obliged to adopt a more
rigorous safeguard for the admissibility of evidence
under the Due Process Clause of the Alaska
Constitution,
thus
construing
Alaska's
constitutional provision as affording rights beyond
the framework of those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. 12
It is interesting to note the Stephan court's
emphasis on the need to ensure that the
voluntariness of a confession is confirmed by
reference to an objective and complete record is at
least as important as the need to ensure the validity
of a breath alcohol test that is tested independently.
The court felt that given the relative ease with
which such confirmation could be provided,
there
113
it.
require
to
not
reason
legitimate
no
was
The Stephan court also noted the heavy burden
upon the state to show that a defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to counsel. It found that
the contents of an interrogation are material to
determining the voluntariness of a confession. It
recognized that the trial court must resolve the
typical "swearing contest" between the officer and
defendant from a situation in which the
interrogation is conducted largely in communicado.
Private interrogations result in a "gap in our
.11
Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1159-60.
112/d. at 1160.
113 Id.
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knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the
interrogation room."'1 14 The Stephan court justified
its recording mandate on the basis that a tape
recording would provide the most objective means
for evaluating exactly what took place during an
interrogation.
In adopting the recording requirement, the
Stephan court held that the recording must clearly
indicate that it recounts the entire interview process,
including the admonition of the Miranda rights and
any waiver of them, so that the court is not left to
speculate about what transpired from the very
beginning of the interview. It further held that
anytime a full recording is not made, the state was
under a duty to provide proof by a preponderance of
the evidence that recording was not feasible under
the circumstances. However, in such cases, the
failure to record would be viewed with distrust." 5
In those instances in which the court determined
that a recording of the interrogation was not feasible
despite the good faith efforts of the officers
involved, the state would have the burden of
proving the defendant's
confession was knowing
1 16
and voluntary.
In forging a clear mandate regarding recording,
the Stephan court adopted a general rule of
exclusion recognizing that while other approaches
have merit, an exclusionary rule would strike the
best balance of protecting a suspect's rights,
providing clear and definite direction to officers,
and preserving the integrity of the justice system." 17
The Alaska court sought to achieve two purposes in
4

1

Id. at 1161.

15

'6 Id. at 1162-63.

1 1d.at 1163.
117 id.

33

420

ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS

utilizing a general exclusionary rule: deterring
illegal methods of law enforcement, and ensuring
judicial integrity by preventing courts from
becoming parties to 8 the invasion of a suspect's
constitutional rights." 1
The importance of the Alaska court's opinion is
its pointed intent to ensure and enhance the integrity
of the judicial system, which it felt to be in question
whenever a court ruled upon the admissibility of a
questionable confession. This was particularly the
case when such a confession was based solely upon
a court's acceptance of the testimony of an
interested party, the interrogating officer, or the
suspect. The Alaska Supreme Court deemed trial
courts to have even greater responsibility when
objective evidence of a confession could have been
preserved by the "mere flip of a switch."'1 19
Requiring recording of the custodial interrogation
process would provide objective, reliable evidence
and would go far in avoiding any suggestion that a
court was biased in favor of either party.
Ultimately, the Alaska court sought to further
the protection of individual constitutional rights
through a general exclusionary rule. As the court
noted, "[S]trong protection is needed to ensure that
a suspect's right to counsel, his privilege against
self-incrimination, and due process guarantees are
protected.' 120 Recognizing that a confession is
generally considered conclusive evidence of guilt,
the court found that such a rule of exclusion was
justified in any circumstance where the state,
without excuse, failed to preserve evidence of the
interaction between interrogator and interrogated
"' Id. at 1163, n.25.
"

9

Id. at 1164.

120d.
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leading up to the formal statement. Again, the court
noted that the arbitrary failure to preserve the entire
interrogation directly affected a defendant's ability
to present his defense, either at trial or at a
suppression hearing regarding the admissibility of
the confession. 12 1 The court went on to recognize
exclusion of the confession as the only appropriate
remedy for unexcused failure to electronically
record the
interrogation when a recording was
22
feasible. 1
In almost two decades since the Supreme Court
of Alaska mandated the recording of stationhouse
interrogations whenever feasible, only one other
court has followed suit. Expressly endorsing the
reasoning of the Alaska court, the Minnesota
Supreme Court exercised its supervisory power in
holding that interrogators must record, whenever
feasible, all custodial interrogations of criminal
suspects when questioning takes place at a place of
detention.123 The court further held that violation of
this requirement could lead to suppression of any
evidence obtained from the interrogation. 124 The
Scales court chose not to determine at that time
whether a criminal suspect had a due process right
under the Minnesota Constitution to have his
custodial interrogation recorded. 125 Instead, the
court based its holding on its "supervisory126 power to
ensure the fair administration of justice."'
The Minnesota court had admonished law
enforcement officers on two prior occasions for
121id.
122

Id.

123

Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 587.

124Id. at 592.

125
id.
126 id.

35

422

ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS

their failure to electronically record the custodial
interrogations of criminal suspects.127
The
Minnesota court noted in State v. Robinson128 that
many factual disputes arising from a suspect's claim
of a violation of his constitutional rights could be
prevented if interrogations were recorded.
Similarly, in State v. Pilcher,129 the court criticized
officers for their failure to use technological means
at their disposal to fully record those conversations
and events transpiring before the actual questioning
itself The court issued the warning that it would
look with great disfavor upon further disregard of
its warnings. 130
The Scales case was the
consequence and, in essence, the result of law
enforcement's failure to heed the court's
admonitions.
The Minnesota court, in a finding similar to that
of the Alaska Supreme Court, noted the benefits
that a recording requirement would provide by
citing the resulting reduction in the number of
disputes over adherence to the Miranda
requirements and the voluntariness of purported
waivers of those Miranda rights. The benefits of
such recordings would facilitate a defendant's
challenge to an officer's misleading or false
testimony while protecting the
state against
31
defendant.'
a
by
claims
meritless
Whereas the Stephan court adopted the
exclusionary rule as a sanction for violating its
recording requirement, the Scales court's reasoning
127

See State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991);

State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224, n.5 (Minn. 1988).
128 Robinson, 427 N.W.2d at 224, n.5.

Pilcher,472 N.W. at 333.
id.
131 Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591.
129
30
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was different. Although it utilized the same sort of
exclusionary rule for violating its recording
mandate, the Scales court noted that application of
the exclusionary rule to an interrogation statement
that was obtained in violation of its recording rule
would be decided on a case-by-case basis and
excluded only in the event that a statement was
obtained because of a "substantial" violation. 132
Texas is the third state that presently has a
recording requirement, but that requirement is much
more limited than in either Alaska or Minnesota.
Pursuant to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
Art.38.22, Section 2, the interrogator must only
record the confession, but not the interrogation
preceding the confession. 133
Dix 134 provides a
review of how Texas confession law developed
legislatively, noting that Texas courts have
traditionally adhered to the general rule prohibiting
the use of oral, out of court confessions against a
defendant. 13 5 It appears that the premise of the
Texas statute is that oral confessions made by
suspects in custody are inherently unreliable and,
consequently, inadmissible for any purpose. 36
Dix notes that the Texas legislature's decision to
allow the evidentiary use of recorded oral
statements was widely viewed as a major
modification of the Texas prohibition against use of
oral, out of court confessions.' 37 In legislating such
a modification, the state legislature exhibited a
132 Id. at 592.
133 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 38.22, §3 (1999).

See generally Dix, supra note 92.
31 Id. at 5.
136 See Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973).
134

137See

Dix, supra note 92, at 71.
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concern for the interests of the reliability and
accuracy of the in-court representations of what a
defendant had orally admitted prior to trial. The
legislature seemed to manifest a desire to prevent or
deter unacceptable police behavior by requiring an
objective record of what transpired in the
interrogation and confession process. 138 While the
thrust of the Texas statute focuses on the reliability
aspects of recording, there is no right on the part of
a defendant to a1 39visual recording as opposed to an
audio recording.'
Illinois became the fourth state in the nation to
require police to tape interrogations. Beginning in
2005, under a new state law, officers are required to
tape interrogations of murder suspects or risk
suppression of the suspect's confession as
evidence. 140 The Illinois statute, which was signed
into law by Governor Rod Blagojevich on July 17,
2003, is an outgrowth of reforms recommended by
former Governor Ryan's Commission on Capital
Cases. The Commission's recommendations were a
consequence of alleged widespread police
misconduct, including coerced confessions, in
obtaining convictions against a number of
individuals sentenced to death and ultimately freed.
The statute contains a number of exceptions,
including one allowing use of untaped statements in
court if electronic recording was not feasible. Other
exceptions allow the admission of out-of-state
interrogations and spontaneous statements if not
made in response to questioning by officers. 14 1 The
138

131

d.
Id. at 73, n. 256.

140 See generally Post, supra note 66; Mills, supra note 66.
141 See Post, supra note 66, at 18.
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Illinois directive recognizes that in certain
circumstances it is neither practical nor possible to
obtain contemporaneous recordings. At the same
time, it recognizes the necessity of a recorded
statement when a suspect in a stationhouse gives a
formal confession.
Although only a few courts and legislatures
have enacted mandatory recording requirements
concerning interrogations, it is likely that more will
follow in the future. Tennessee recently considered
such a mandate through legislation. The following
section examines the Tennessee legislative proposal
that renders inadmissble any statement made by an
accused
during
an
unrecorded
custodial
interrogation.
D. Tennessee's Legislative Proposal
Although a strong argument could be made that
the mandatory recording of interrogations involves
a due process issue and is therefore a constitutional
issue necessitating judicial protection, the first
move for reform was initiated by the Tennessee
legislature. 142 As noted previously, compelling
policy reasons supported such a move. Indeed, the
Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized the value
of such a rule in terms of conserving judicial
resources by reducing the amount of court time
spent resolving disputes over what took place
142 The

legislature's first proposal to adopt a mandatory

recording requirement was contained in SB0343/HB 1138.
Tennessee Proposal, supra note 5. Note that additional
versions of a mandatory recording bill were introduced in the
most recent Legislative session. See SB 1679/HB204. These
versions are substantially similar to the original bills and do
not raise materially different issues regarding the discussion in
this article.
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during an interrogation, but has nonetheless
43
declined to adopt a rule requiring such recording. 1
As the court commented in State v. Odom, the issue
of electronic recording of custodial interrogations
"is one more properly directed to the General
Assembly."' 144 Such legislation, if adopted, would
allow state courts to sidestep the question of
whether such recording is a constitutional
prerequisite for the admissibility of confessions.
The Tennessee
proposal
would require
electronic recording, by video or audio, of the entire
interrogation, including that which preceded the
confession. The bill would essentially prohibit the
"softening up" of a suspect, then capturing the
admonishments, waiver, and confession in a
subsequent session.
The proposed recording
requirement was limited to a custodial interrogation
conducted at a place of detention.
Both the
Miranda rights and any waiver of those rights
would have to be captured on the recording. All
voices would have to be identified and, upon
motion, defense counsel would receive a copy of
the interrogation prior to any hearing requiring the
recorded confessions or waivers.
Further, the proposed bill would also apply to
written statements made during the course of
custodial
interrogations,
which
would
be
inadmissible as evidence unless the defendant
voluntarily and knowingly waived her or his
Miranda rights. Any statements made by a suspect
during custodial interrogation which are not
recorded in compliance with the proposal would be
admissible for impeachment purposes only. The
141

See Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759 at 772.

'44 Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23-24.
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preponderance of the evidence burden in that
situation would be upon the suspect to show that he
was subjected to a custodial interrogation that was
not recorded, and later subjected to a recorded
interrogation involving the same offense.
Moreover, the bill required electronic recording
of the entire police interview before a particular
For maximum
admission became admissible.
objective value, the entire interrogation session
needs recording, beginning with the first
It is extremely
introduction of the parties.
important that all preliminaries be recorded because
they are often a breeding ground for claims of
physical and psychological pressure and could
undermine the reliability of any subsequent
Merely capturing the defendant's
recording.
incriminating comments without also recording the
police "lead-in" would give an imbalanced picture
of the entire event. Frequently, what takes place in
the beginning of an interrogation dictates the
outcome. 145 It is clear that a recording of properly
trained officers eliciting a confession from a suspect
A recording
could withstand legal challenges.
lacking the initial contact between interrogator and
suspect fails to accomplish the primary objective of
a recording requirement: creating an accurate,
detailed, and complete record of an interrogation.
The exclusionary requirement of the proposal
These
was tempered by certain exceptions.
exceptions included statements made by a suspect
in open court during a trial, before a grand jury, or
at preliminary hearing; res gestae statements 146;
145 See, e.g., Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1164 (quoting Harris,678

P.2d at 413-14).
146 The term res gestae is commonly confused with the excited

utterance hearsay exception.

NEAL COHEN, SARAH

41

428

ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS

statements
not produced
during custodial
interrogation; statements made in circumstances in
which videotaping was not feasible; and statements
made under other exigent circumstances. If the
State sought to demonstrate that any of the
exceptions should apply, it would have to do so by a
preponderance of the evidence. The numerous
exceptions contained in the bill adequately
addressed feasibility concerns likely to be voiced by
law enforcement.
Apart from the exigent
circumstances exception, the general feasibility
exceptions would have allowed officers to show
that it was not possible for them to record the
particular interrogation.
One drawback of the legislation was that it
would have allowed an audio recording in lieu of
videotaping. An audio recording would obviously
not capture the physical nuances of the parties nor
would it show the physical environs. Much as DUI
enforcement utilizes videotape to capture a person's
actions, a videotape would more reliably record the
entire context of an encounter. The parties' actions
and demeanor, which are of paramount importance
in an interrogation setting, would be largely ignored
by use of a sound recording.
Moreover, there would be difficulty in
indicating when multiple interrogators were present;
an audio recording alone may not always clearly
indicate which person was talking.
If the
interviewer and interviewee consistently talk over
each other, neither may be understood. Perhaps
SHEPPEARD & DONALD PAINE, TENNESSEE LAW OF
EVIDENCE, 532 (1995). The proposal does not define the
term or distinguish it from the spontaneous statement
exception under section (g) (6) of the Tennessee Proposal.
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most important, however, is that descriptions of
head, eye, facial, or hand movements would not be
conveyed to a listener without a verbal clarification.
In short, a sound recording by itself simply cannot
convey the entire context within which the words
are conveyed.
The House and Senate Judiciary Committees
directed the Tennessee Law Enforcement Advisory
Council to study and evaluate issues related to
electronic recording of custodial interrogations of
suspects and to report its final findings or
recommendations following the convening of the
103rd General Assembly. 147 The purpose of the
Advisory Council 148 is to monitor and evaluate the
status of technological developments and related
issues to Tennessee law enforcement, and to submit
its findings to the governor and legislative judiciary
committees.
The
Comptroller's
Office
of Research
developed a survey for all Tennessee law
enforcement
agencies
in November,
2002.
Tennessee law enforcement personnel from 400
agencies responded to the survey. 14 9 43 percent of
agencies that responded electronically record
custodial interrogations. 15
The primary reasons
cited for not recording interrogations included the
following:
sufficiency of a written statement;
unwillingness of suspects to speak if they are
recorded; prohibitive equipment cost; and concerns
14' H.R.J. Res. 862, 102nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2002).
148Delineated in TENN. CODE ANN. §38-13-101 et. seq.
149 TENNESSEE LAW ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION SURVEY, TENNESSEE
COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE OF RESEARCH (2002).
150 Id. at 2.
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about equipment malfunctions.' 5 '
Agencies
utilizing recording report that it provides numerous
benefits including enhanced law enforcement
credibility, availability of tapes for training, reduced
officer time in court, and ease of demonstrating that
the suspect has been treated fairly. 152 The major
drawback cited by those using recording was the
expense associated with recording custodial
interrogations. 153 Only 23.3 percent of agencies
using electronic recording recorded all custodial
interrogations. Of the agencies reporting that they
recorded some custodial interrogations, the decision
to record54was based primarily on the severity of the
offense. 1
The Council identified several concerns
regarding electronic recording of custodial
interrogations.
The most significant concern
centered on the costs associated with such
recording, 155 specifically costs associated with
recording all custodial interrogations. The proposal
mandated the recording of custodial interrogations
at a place of detention.
Because some
interrogations undoubtedly occur outside of the
stationhouse, cost concerns could be lessened.
There was also a concern that recording would
not serve the interest of judicial economy because
confessions encourage plea bargains. 15 6 Common
sense would seem to indicate, however, that a tape
evidencing a voluntary confession would make a
151Id.

152 id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 3.
155See Jennings,

15 6

Id. at 3.

supra note 75, at 2.

44

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL.

I: 3 431

defendant less likely to challenge the admissibility
of the statement. Moreover, recordings would most
certainly lead to fewer allegations of improper,
abusive, or coercive interrogation procedures that
could result in civil litigation and involve judicial
resources beyond the criminal justice system.
The cost of failing to implement the recording
program would far outweigh the cost of recording
when the increased cost of criminal and civil
litigation due to allegations of improper police
conduct is figured in. The cost of the recording
equipment and videotapes is minuscule compared to
the cost of going to trial with tainted evidence and
the resulting lawsuits involving police accused of
unethical conduct.
DNA technology has cleared scores of
defendants years after their convictions, including
some who were on death row, many of whom had
confessed to crimes they did not commit. DNA
technology is costly, but its benefits are considered
invaluable. What price is too high to bolster the
truth-finding function of the law? Effectively using
electronic recordings of interrogations would likely
result in significant cost savings to the criminal
justice system as a whole.
In this society, with its advanced technology and
almost
universal
availability
of recording
technology, there is no reason not to increase the
reliability of the criminal justice system as much as
possible by requiring recording. Resisting the use
of inexpensive technology to safeguard due process
and fairness is unjustifiable.
The interrogation
event should speak for itself. The fact-finder should
not be required to filter through inferences drawn
from a "he-said, she-said" drama involving the
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disparate perceptions of individuals, each with their
own perceptual biases or shortcomings.
This Tennessee legislature's recording proposal
was tabled in spring 2004. If this proposal is not
implemented, reliability and accuracy will continue
to be sacrificed in the name of efficiency and
expediency. In the absence of legislative action on
recording, it falls to the judiciary to take the lead in
addressing the issue.
IV. The Tennessee Supreme Court's Supervisory
Powers Argument
The obvious judicial response given the
Tennessee Supreme Court's history is to adopt a
due process approach and find that the Tennessee
Constitution requires mandatory videotaping to
ensure a criminal defendant's basic rights to
fairness. The court has a history of interpreting
constitutional
rights, both procedural
and
substantive, more
broadly
than
the
United
States
57
Supreme Court. 1
In addition, the state's due process approach has
found legal support in one other state. The Alaska
Supreme Court in Stephan v. State158 held under its
state constitution that due process required
electronic recording of stationhouse interrogations.
This approach has the added attraction of operating
as an extension of the United States Supreme
Court's Miranda decision, which is firmly
59
entrenched in this country's criminal process.
157 See

State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989);
Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist, 38
S.W.3d. 1 (Tenn. 2000).
58 Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1156.
59 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
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Since Miranda was given a firm constitutional
grounding in the Supreme Court's Dickerson
decision, 16 what began as a prophylactic rule made
by judicial fiat has been strengthened. Videotaped
interrogations could share a similar lineage and
become enshrined as constitutional doctrine.
constitutional
this
The court addressed
in State v.
fashion,
in
a
cursory
approach, albeit
16 1
In Godsey, the court considered but did
Godsey.
not ultimately apply due process and other
in
support of
considerations
constitutional
to
mandatory videotaping. Rather, the court elected
62
consideration.1
legislative
to
matter
the
leave
However, the Godsey case does not end the
inquiry into the court's possible involvement in this
matter. There is another compelling argument that
the court has not specifically addressed: the court
has the power and duty, under both statutory and
case law, in its supervision and administration of
the criminal justice system, to order videotaped
interrogations when significant public interest
demands it. This "supervisory powers" argument
has been the basis for court action in a number of
important areas in the criminal justice system
63
specifically and the judicial system generally.'
The basis for the Tennessee Supreme Court's
supervisory powers is perhaps best summarized in
Cantor v. Brading:
The supreme judicial and judicial
supervisory power [of the Supreme Court]
160

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

161

60 S.W.3d 759.

162

Id.

163 See infra notes 168, 169, 171-73.
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is an inherent power of the Supreme Court
and has been so recognized by the
legislative branch of our government.
T.C.A. §16-331 recognized that the
Supreme Court has power to take all
actions as may be necessary to the orderly
administration of justice within the State,
whether enumerated in that Code section
or elsewhere. T.C.A. §16-332 declares
that the power is of common law origin as
64
it existed at the time of our Constitution.'
The court's supervisory or plenary powers are
clearly endorsed by the current statutory schemes in
T.C.A. §16-3-503 and -504.
This power is in
addition to the court's ability to make specific rules,
either by drafting rules of court or court opinions.
An example of the court's supervisory power is
found in Rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules. Rule
13 adopts a broad scheme of appointing attorneys
and resources to indigent defendants, setting out
elaborate procedures, standards and fees for the
appointment of counsel in capital and non-capital
cases. Section 3 in particular sets out standards of
experience and training that specifically govern who
may and may not sit as counsel in a capital case.
There is nothing in either the federal or Tennessee
constitutions, nor in case law decided under them,
specifically calling for these procedures. In fact, the
constitutional requirements related to the right to
assistance of counsel are generally couched in terms
of competency and effectiveness, and the United
States Supreme Court's standards for competency
of counsel are couched in broad terms requiring
164 Cantor v. Brading, 494 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tenn. App.

1973).
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standards
of
counsel
to 65 meet
minimal
1
performance.
Rule 13, at least as it applies to capital counsel,
goes well beyond the minimal standards demanded
by constitutional considerations.
It appears to
enhance and embellish the specific rights to counsel
found in both the federal and Tennessee
constitutions. Furthermore, Rule 13 also comes
with a price tag. Experienced attorneys handling
death penalty cases will spend more time and
resources on the case than inexperienced attorneys,
and since attorneys bill the state for their fees in
appointed cases, the bills submitted by Rule 13
attorneys cost the taxpayers more.
Another example of the court using its plenary
powers to make rules that embellish and enhance
constitutional rights is in Section VII of Rule 11 of
the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules. The purpose
of this rule, which sets out detailed procedures for
appointing substitute judges in the absence of a
presiding trial judge, is to empower the 66state
constitution's guarantee of open proceedings.1
These examples illustrate the court's willingness
to address a problem, overlooked by the legislature,
in the administration of the criminal justice system,
as well as a willingness to promulgate rules of
conduct that ensure constitutional rights in spite of
potential financial impact.
The court does not
accept the argument that it should refrain from
addressing a problem when legislative action is not
forthcoming. The language in Cary v. Cary is
compelling:

165 See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
166 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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It is primarily for the Legislature to
determine the public policy of this state;
however, where there is no declaration
in the constitution or statutes and the
area is governed by common law
doctrines, it is the province of the courts
to consider the public policy of the state
67
as reflected in old, court-made rules.'
Many other examples of the Tennessee Supreme
Court's rulemaking fall into a second category:
adopting a procedure or rule under the plenary
powers as part of a court decision to deal with a
specific issue before it. State v. Reid 168 is an
example of such a decision in which a "rule" is
announced as part of the court's opinion. The Reid
court approved of the trial court's adoption of a rule
establishing a notice requirement for the defense
when mental health evidence was to be admitted at
the sentencing phase of a case. This procedure was
adopted to standardize a response to a recurring
problem and was approved by the court despite the
defense argument that the court could not create a
statutory procedure when none was in place. The
absence of legislative activity is not the end of the
inquiry; rather, in some areas, it is the beginning.
In a similar area, the Tennessee Supreme Court,
in Van Tran v. State, 69 used its plenary powers to
establish a procedure to be applied by lower courts
when a death row inmate asserted a competency
defense to application of the death penalty. Van
Tran is another example of the court intervening
where it felt it necessary to protect a defendant's
Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1996).
168 State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1998).
167

169 Van

Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999).
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basic constitutional rights.' 70 Again, the court did
not hesitate to address an area of the law in which
the legislature had not set forth any rules or
procedures to ensure fairness and consistency.
Other examples of the court's exercise of its
supervisory powers specifically involve evidentiary
problems. For example, in Mathis v. State,171 the
court reversed a murder conviction by applying a
rule requiring that convictions based on the
testimony of an accomplice be corroborated by
independent evidence. 172 There is nothing in either
the federal or Tennessee Constitutions requiring
corroboration of accomplice testimony. In fact,
neither constitution says much about the types of
evidence that are admissible in a criminal trial. The
court's action suggests, however, that this
corroboration "rule" helps to ensure that convictions
are based upon reliable evidence. Similar to the
rule regarding the appointment of counsel, the
corroboration rule has potential costs to law
enforcement and prosecutors in the handling of
criminal cases. The costs associated with finding
and bringing to court corroboration witnesses
necessary to support a conviction are real.
In State v. Smith,'7 3 the court had the
opportunity to address another evidentiary issue.
The issue, a potential nightmare for the prosecution,
involved the introduction of hearsay testimony that
another person committed the crime for which the
defendant was being tried. The court set forth
170 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
171Mathis v. State, 590 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1979).
172See

Proctor v. State, 565 S.W.2d 909 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1978).
"' Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450.
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standards that must be met before the introduction
of a third party's admission of guilt. Although this
case would seem to limit the scope of evidence
offered by a defendant, it nonetheless indicates the
court's concern with reliability of evidence.
It might be argued that the above examples are
distinguishable from the issue of videotaped
interrogations in that the above examples show the
court's exercise of its supervisory powers in
implementing procedures to be followed by the
lower courts. The videotaping issue, on the other
hand potentially involves the court's imposition of
rules on another branch of government, namely, law
enforcement.
A strong argument exists for the court to act in
the areas directly related to the supervision of the
lower courts of this state. The high court is the
repository of judicial power in the state, and without
question has the ultimate power to supervise the
practice of attorneys and lower courts. However,
this distinction should not bar rule-making in this
area.
First, the clear language of the Tennessee
Supreme Court indicates that its plenary power
extends broadly to the "administration of justice" in
Tennessee. 174 Moreover, as previously noted, the
court has adopted other rules that impose costs on
police, the prosecution and the public. Certainly,
the court's establishment of rules or guidelines for
admissibility of evidence is related to the
administration of justice, especially when
compelling public policy reasons require the court's
involvement. As such, one of the most important
174

Belmont v. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 511 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn.

1974).
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functions of any court is ensuring
the reliability of
1 75
case.
criminal
a
in
evidence
Further, the Tennessee Supreme Court expressly
adopted the United States Supreme Court's dictates
in the Miranda,176 Weeks, 177 McNabb, 7 8 and
Mallory179 cases, all of which involved United
States Supreme Court rule-making. The Tennessee
Supreme Court has never found the rules announced
in these cases unenforceable because they were
promulgated by the judicial system in the absence
of a legislative mandate. Moreover, the rules in the
above cases involved potential costs imposed on
law enforcement. Even before Dickerson,8 0 which
shows Miranda to be rooted in the federal
Constitution, the Tennessee
Supreme Court
approved Miranda as a prophylactic rule to protect
a defendant's constitutional rights. In fact, the court
has intimated that its view of the self-incrimination
privilege is broader and more expansive than the
privilege in the federal Constitution.' 8 1 Rulemaking in the area of interrogations, thus, has been
a fixed part of the law in this state for years.
The final, and perhaps most compelling, reason
for judicial rule-making in this area is that the
defendant's rights are central to the notion of a fair
trial. The right against self-incrimination, the right
to confront witnesses and evidence, and the right to
the assistance of counsel are all fundamental and
necessary.
The notion that videotaping of
...
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
176 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
177 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
178 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
179 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
180 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 428.
181See Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 455.
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interrogations is necessary to protect those
important constitutional rights is compelling.
Rights are substantially enhanced by the
videotaping recuirement in the ways thoroughly
explored above. 82

The supervisory powers approach to this
problem has been adopted by one state's high court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court was asked in State v.
Scales' 83 to follow the Alaska Supreme Court's
holding in Stephan v. State,184 and hold that the
Minnesota
Constitution
requires
mandatory
videotaping. The Scales court instead mandated the
taping based on its inherent supervisory powers to
insure the fair administration of justice. The Scales
court held that recording of interrogations at a place
of detention was a "reasonable and necessary
safeguard" essential85 to preserving valuable
constitutional rights.'
The voluntariness jurisprudence of the United
State Supreme Court developed initially in part to
ensure that the product of police interrogations is
reliable.
As a general principle, then, it is
reasonable to demand that a court admit the most
reliable evidence available. Frequently that means
assessing the admissibility of a defendant's
statement.
Videotaping interrogations also touches on the
issue of reliability. All trial courts routinely deal
with this issue. Matters involving introduction of
hearsay evidence, the application of the best
evidence rule, and admission of expert testimony all
182 See supra pp. 404-07.
183 Scales, 518 N.W.2d at

587.

84

1 Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1156.
1s5

518 N.W.2d at 592.
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require courts to serve as gate-keepers.1 86 At
common law, courts served a similar function. In
the absence of formal rules of evidence, an even
greater responsibility was placed on the court to
evaluate evidence. Professor Jones perhaps states it
best: "It has been broadly stated that the best
evidence that is obtainable under the circumstances
of the case must be adduced to prove any disputed
fact."

1 87

It seems clear that the Tennessee Supreme Court
had the common law power to make rules related to
the determination of the reliability of evidence. As
seen in Smith 188 and Proctor,189 the court has
embraced this common law power in recent times.
By adopting a mandatory videotaping rule, the
Tennessee Supreme Court would simply continue a
tradition of intervening in evidentiary matters that
influence the "administration of justice" in this state
and for which there are no legislative solutions.
A major argument in support of videotaping a
defendant's interrogation is that by preserving the
entire context of the encounter, as well as the exact
words spoken by the parties, the court would allow
a more reliable version of the evidence to come
before the fact finder. The benefits to the fact
finder, as well as to the public's assurance that the
186 See, e.g. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509

U.S. 579 (1993)(rejecting Frye's "general acceptance" test for
admissibility of scientific evidence and placing burden on trial
judge under Federal Rules of Evidence to make important
preliminary assessments of reliability of scientific
methodology).
187 1 BURR W. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND

CRIMINAL, §231,444 (1958).
188 Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 450.
89 Proctor,565 S.W.2d at 909.
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trial procedure is fair, are clear. 19° The question is
not whether the court is constitutionally required to
resolve this problem, although as discussed in
Section III.C., several state courts have found
constitutional grounding for their decisions
requiring mandatory taping. The argument is that
the court should use its plenary power as it has in
other areas in the criminal justice system when to
do so comes at little price to the government and
provides a compelling service to the adversarial
system.
Indeed, if the Tennessee Supreme Court began
as a general trial court that routinely dealt with
problems of reliability of evidence, then the modem
court, which derives much of its plenary power
from that era, clearly has the power to intervene in
this area where the legislature has not. Requiring
the videotaping of interrogations is surely no more
of an intrusion in police affairs than Miranda,
McNabb, and Mallory. All of these rules have one
thing in common: they ensure that justice is
administered more fairly than would be the case in
the absence of the rules.
By exercising its plenary power over the issue
of recording interrogations, the court would actually
accomplish two things.
In addition to giving
vitality to important constitutional rights, it would
also ensure the fair administration of justice.
Moreover, videotaping is beneficial to all citizens.
A videotape of the interrogation event ensures the
availability of a more objective form of evidence for
courts to use in ruling on the propriety of the police
conduct. This will lead to fairer rulings as to
whether the evidence should be admitted in criminal
190 See supra notes 55, 73 and 87.
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proceedings. With better rulings, the public will be
assured that verdicts are based on more reliable
proof and are worthy of public support.
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